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Inequalities  in  health  and  health  care  are  caused  by  different  factors.  Measuring  "unfair" 
inequalities  implies  that  a  distinction  is  introduced  between  causal  variables  leading  to 
ethically  legitimate  inequalities  and  causal  variables  leading  to  ethically  illegitimate 
inequalities. An example of the former could be life-style choices, an example of the latter is 
social background. We show how to derive measures of unfair inequalities in health and in 
health  care  delivery  from  a  structural  model  of  health  care  and  health  production:  “direct 
unfairness”, linked to the variations in medical expenditures and health in the hypothetical 
distribution  in  which  all  legitimate  sources  of  variation  are  kept  constant;  “fairness  gap”, 
linked to the differences between the actual distribution and the hypothetical distribution in 
which  all  illegitimate  sources  of  variation  have  been  removed.  These  two  approaches  are 
related to the theory of fair allocation. In general they lead to different results. We propose to 
analyse  the  resulting  distributions  with  the  traditional  apparatus  of  Lorenz  curves  and 
inequality  measures.  We  compare  our  proposal  to  the  more  common  approach  using 
concentration  curves  and  analyse  the  relationship  with  the  methods  of  direct  and  indirect 
standardization. We discuss how inequalities in health care can be integrated in an overall 
evaluation of social inequality. 
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T h e r ei sb yn o wav e r yl a r g el i t e r a t u r eo nd i ﬀerent aspects of inequity in health, both
from a theoretical and from an empirical point of view. This literature focuses mainly
on socioeconomic inequalities in health and in the delivery of health care (Wagstaﬀ and
Van Doorslaer, 2000a). While diﬀerent methods (including the calculation of odds ratios)
have been proposed in the public health literature (Mackenbach and Kunst, 1997), the
concentration curve has become the workhorse in most health economic studies. Recently,
a number of papers have been published which propose a welfare economic foundation for
its use (Wagstaﬀ, 2002; Koolman and van Doorslaer, 2004; Bleichrodt and van Doorslaer,
2006) or advocate alternative approaches (Bommier and Stecklov, 2002; Becker et al.,
2005; Abul Naga and Geoﬀard, 2006; Zheng, 2006; Dias and Jones, 2007; Fleurbaey,
2006b).
When moving from the measurement of inequality (in health or in health care) as such
to socioeconomic inequality, one implicitly assumes that policy-makers are more concerned
or should be more concerned about some causes of observed overall inequality, such as
socioeconomic background, than about other causes. In the literature on health inequality,
it is implicitly accepted that health inequalities within a socioeconomic group are less
problematic than health inequalities between socioeconomic groups. And in the literature
on equity in health care delivery, it is quite reasonably taken for granted that diﬀerences
in use which reﬂect diﬀerences in needs are not only unproblematic, but even desirable.
All in all, this strongly suggests that some inequalities are "legitimate" while others are
n o t .T h em o s to b v i o u sj u s t i ﬁcation for making this distinction between "legitimate" and
"illegitimate" diﬀerences is that the former can be attributed to causes that belong to
individual responsibility. Given this background, it is striking that, while there are clear
links between the literature on income inequality and the literature on socioeconomic
inequalities in health and in health care, there has been until now hardly any link with
the growing literature in social choice on equity, responsibility and compensation (Roemer,
1998; Fleurbaey, 2008). This paper tries to bridge part of that gap.
As soon as one formulates the problem of illegitimate or "unfair" inequalities in this
3general framework, one is immediately confronted with the observation that, in addition
to socioeconomic background, there are many more causes of inequalities that may be a
cause of ethical concern. Why should we then focus almost exclusively on socioeconomic
inequalities in health care consumption? Is it less problematic if someone is denied health
care because she lives in another region of the country? (Or, for that matter, in another
country?) Why should we not be interested in equality of health as such? Because part of
these health diﬀerences is unavoidable, or not created by socioeconomic institutions? And,
suppose we restrict ourselves to avoidable health inequalities, why then focus again almost
exclusively on socioeconomic health inequalities? And what if socioeconomic diﬀerences
in health can to some extent be explained by diﬀerences in lifestyle? In this paper we will
deﬁne an "equitable" situation as a situation without unfair inequalities - and inequalities
are deﬁned as unfair when they follow from causes which do not belong to the sphere
of individual responsibility. The socioeconomic background of individuals is one of these
causes - but, although very important, it is not the only one. It is necessary to get a more
complete perspective on these diﬀerent causes.
The method we propose consists of three steps. In the ﬁrst (explanatory) step one
has to construct a structural model to estimate the relative importance of the diﬀerent
causes of inequality and to get a better insight into their possible interactions. In a
second (normative) step, one decides which of these causes lead to legitimate and which
to illegitimate (or unfair) inequalities. The third step involves the measurement of these
unfair inequalities. We will focus on the choices to be made in that third step.
There are of course diﬀerent opinions in society with respect to what belongs to
the sphere of individual responsibility. Some will claim that equality of access is a better
criterion than equality of use, because individuals should be held responsible for their own
choices. Some will claim that health diﬀerences following from diﬀerences in life-style are
not problematic, because individuals should be held responsible for their smoking and
drinking behavior. Some will claim that health diﬀerences reﬂecting diﬀerences in age
or in genetic endowments are not unfair, because they are unavoidable. But in each of
these cases there are also proponents of the opposite view. We will show how diﬀerent
4views about equity (or about unfair inequalities) can be interpreted as diﬀerent views
about where to draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate causes of diﬀerences, i.e.
as diﬀerent options taken in the second step referred to above. Our method to measure
inequality (the third step) works for any of these options and can therefore accommodate
many diﬀerent ethical views. This has the advantage that one can also compare the results
for diﬀerent approaches within one general encompassing framework.
In our view, unfair inequalities in the health domain cannot be separated from unfair
inequalities in other domains. The overall social objective is to minimize unfair inequalities
in welfare. Health is important because it is one of the most crucial dimensions of welfare.
Health care is important because it contributes to better health, and perhaps also directly
t oah i g h e rw e l f a r el e v e l .A l t h o u g ht h e r ei st h i sc l e a rh i e r a r c h y ,w ea g r e et h a ti ti su s e f u l
to consider also inequalities at the lower levels, not in the least because health care and
health policy are separate policy domains.
We introduce our basic concepts in section 2 for a simple case with two variables. We
propose two possible approaches to measuring unfair inequalities. Direct unfairness refers
to inequalities in health or health care after one has removed the eﬀect of all legitimate
variables. The fairness gap measures the distance between the actual distribution and
a fair distribution in which all the eﬀects of illegitimate variables have been removed.
We show why, in general, these two approaches do not yield the same results. Section
3 sketches the broad contours of a structural model of health and health care. Section
4 shows how the concepts from section 2 and the structural model of section 3 can be
combined to conceptualize unfair inequalities in health care and in health. We also discuss
within our framework the problem of aggregating the diﬀerent elements in the health care
vector for the purpose of measuring inequity. In section 5 we argue that some additional
normative choices have to be made when moving from the empirical model to the calcu-
lation of inequality. We show that direct unfairness is analogous to direct standardization
and that the calculation of the fairness gap is related to indirect standardization, when the
latter technique is reinterpreted to include all relevant variables. In section 6 we compare
our approach to the traditional work on socioeconomic inequalities using the concentra-
5tion curve and we suggest one possible way to integrate health issues in a broader concern
for equality of welfare. Section 7 concludes.
We focus on conceptual issues with respect to the deﬁnition of unfair inequalities
and we do not really go into problems of implementation. Although we are well aware
that the level at which, e.g., health is measured, may have an inﬂuence on the measure-
ment instruments to be used (see, e.g., van Doorslaer and Jones, 2003; Erreygers, 2006),
we completely neglect this issue.1 Moreover, throughout the paper we work within an
absolute approach to measuring inequalities. This means that we will be referring to
absolute Lorenz curves and to inequality measures which satisfy translation invariance,
i.e. which do not change when a constant is add e dt oa l lt h ee l e m e n t so ft h ev e c t o r .T h i s
is not in line with the dominant practice in economic inequality measurement (including
the measurement of socioeconomic inequalities in health and health care), in which rela-
tive Lorenz curves and scale invariant inequality measures have been much more popular.
Our choice in favour of the absolute approach brings our paper more closely to the social
literature on responsibility and compensation where absolute distances have been used
more often than relative proportions. However, this choice is not necessary, and all the
axioms and results of this paper can be easily reformulated within a relative approach.
2 Direct unfairness and the fairness gap: a simple
example
Let us introduce the basic issues of this paper with a simple example. For illustrative
purposes, we will focus on inequalities in health. In later sections, we will apply the
same ideas in a more elaborate model and also consider the issue of equity in health care
delivery. Let us assume that the health of individual i (i =1 ,...,n) is determined by her
1Although we will be concerned with measurability and comparability of individual welfare in the very
last section.
6income yi and by her life-style li
2, i.e.
hi = h(yi,l i) (1)
Neglecting all problems of measurability -as we will do throughout the paper- it would be
straightforward to construct Lorenz curves for health or to calculate inequality in health.
However, from an ethical point of view, we are mainly interested in ethically objectionable
or unfair inequalities. Let us for the sake of the argument take it for granted that health
inequalities due to diﬀerences in life-style are unproblematic, because we want to hold
people responsible for these.3 Therefore, a measure of unfair inequalities should not reﬂect
health diﬀerences due to diﬀerences in life-style. In our simple example, this means that
we only want to measure so-called "socioeconomic inequalities in health".
H o wt og of r o m" o v e r a l li n e q u a l i t y "t o" u nfair inequality"? One way to approach
the problem is to see it as an exercise of removing from the overall inequality measure all
diﬀerences which are due to lifestyle. What then should remain is a measure of health
inequalities due to income diﬀerences, and to income diﬀerences only. In general (but
very loose) terms, we can summarize this condition for later reference as
Condition 1 (NO INFLUENCE OF LEGITIMATE DIFFERENCES). A measure of
unfair inequality should not reﬂect legitimate variation in outcomes, i.e. inequalities which
are caused by diﬀerences in the responsibility variables.
Another approach starts from the concept of a fair distribution. In our example, in
a fair distribution there should be no health inequalities due to income diﬀerences. This
implies that if two individuals have the same life style, they should have the same health
2For the purpose of this simple example, we use income as an indicator of socio-economic status. As
we will see in the next section, in a broader setting individuals may be held partly responsible for their
income. Moreover, in the real world the health situation of the individuals is determined by many more
variables, not in the least their genetic endowment. We come back to this issue in the later sections. For
the purpose of the simple example in this section, we assume that all these other variables are identical
for all individuals.
3This starting point can be -and has been- hotly debated. We will return to that issue later on in the
paper. At this stage, we only want to illustrate the basic issues related to measuring unfair inequalities.
7level, whatever their income. Again, more generally (but very loosely) formulated, we can
say that a measure of unfair inequality should satisfy the following condition:
Condition 2 (COMPENSATION) If a measure of unfair inequality is zero, there should
be no illegitimate diﬀerences left, i.e. two individuals with the same value for the respon-
sibility variable should have the same outcome.
At ﬁrst sight, both conditions are perfectly clear and it seems obvious that a good
measure of unfair inequality should satisfy both. However, there is a basic problem in
that the two conditions are incompatible as soon as the eﬀect of income on health is
not independent of the life-style. This basic problem is well documented in the social
choice literature and discussed in a long series of publications (a synthesis can be found
in Fleurbaey, 2008). Its consequences, however, have not yet been fully realized in the
literature on the measurement of socioeconomic inequalities in health care or in health.4
Without going into the formal details, we can use our example to convey the basic in-
tuition in a straightforward way. Let us ﬁrst introduce two methods to measure unfair
inequality. These two methods are closely related to the concepts of conditional equality
and egalitarian-equivalence in the literature on fair allocation (see, e.g., Fleurbaey, 2008).
The ﬁrst method (conditional equality) focuses on condition 1. It removes the legit-
imate diﬀerences by ﬁxing the value of li in (1), i.e. by deﬁning a "corrected" value of
health e hi = h(yi,e l). This is the health level that individual i with income yi would reach
if he had the reference lifestyle. Inequality in e h can immediately be measured with the
traditional apparatus of Lorenz curves and inequality measures. We propose to call this
inequality direct unfairness. By construction, a measure of direct unfairness can only
reﬂect variation due to income diﬀerences, since diﬀerences in life style are kept constant.
T h e r e f o r ei ts a t i s ﬁes condition 1. However, there is no reason why it would satisfy con-
dition 2: if there is no inequality in e h, this does not at all guarantee that two individuals
with the same life style will also have the same health level.
4Gravelle (2003) and van Doorslaer et al. (2004) touch the issue, but do not really go into the
normative implications. Schokkaert et al. (1998) and Schokkaert and Van de Voorde (2004, 2006) have
shown its relevance for the problem of risk adjustment.
8The latter condition is satisﬁed automatically by a second method (egalitarian-
equivalence), in which we ﬁrst explicitly deﬁne a fair distribution, i.e. a distribution
in which all the illegitimate sources of variation have been removed. A straightforward
w a yt od ot h i si st oﬁxt h ev a l u eo fyi in (1) and to deﬁne a reference health level for i as
h∗
i = h(y∗,l i). In a fair distribution, the diﬀerence between this ideal reference situation
and the actual situation should be zero or at least equal for all i. Unfair inequality can
therefore be measured by applying the traditional inequality measurement apparatus to
the vector (hi − h∗
i). We call this the approach of the fairness gap. It is immediately
clear that it satisﬁes the compensation condition 2. However, in general it does not sat-
isfy condition 1: the fairness gap may be inﬂuenced by life style, because the diﬀerences
h(yi,l i) − h(y∗,l i) may depend on the value taken by the variable li.
I ng e n e r a l ,t h et w oa p p r o a c h e sw i l ln o ty i e l dt h es a m ec o n c l u s i o n s . M e a s u r e so f
direct unfairness satisfy condition 1, but not condition 2. Measures of the fairness gap
satisfy condition 2, but not condition 1. There is one interesting case in which they do
coincide, however. Suppose that eq. (1) is additively separable, i.e. that it can be written
as h(yi,l i)=f(yi)+g(li). This implies that the eﬀect of income diﬀerences on health is
independent of the life style (and vice versa). In this case, direct unfairness measures the
inequality in the vector (f(yi)+g(e l)), while the fairness gap measures the inequality in
the vector (f(yi)−f(y∗)). The two will give the same result in our absolute measurement
approach.5
A picture may illustrate the issues. Take income to be a continuous variable and
suppose there are two diﬀerent lifestyles in society, denoted lA and lB.T h eﬁgure shows
the functions hA
i = h(yi,l A) and hB
i = h(yi,l B).W ea s s u m et h a tlA is the healthier lifestyle
5Remember that we opt in this paper for an absolute approach to inequality measurement, in which
adding a constant to all elements of a vector does not change inequality. As mentioned before, the
same basic intuitions hold also for the relative approach. To be more speciﬁc, one could instead deﬁne
the fairness gap in relative terms: hi/h∗
i. With this formulation, the direct unfairness and the fairness
gap approaches are equivalent if the health function is multiplicatively separable: h(yi,l i)=f(yi)g(li).
Indeed, one then has e hi = f(yi)g(e l) and hi/h∗
i = f(yi)/f(y∗). In this case, relative inequality measures
and the Lorenz curve are identical for e hi and for hi/h∗
i.
9Figure 1: Direct unfairness and the fairness gap
and that for both lifestyles there is a positive relationship between health and income.
Diﬀerences in health due to diﬀerences in lifestyle are considered to be unproblematic,
but fairness requires that all individuals with the same lifestyle should have the same
health level whatever their income position, i.e. that the curves in the ﬁgure should be
horizontal lines.
When measuring direct unfairness,w eﬁx the lifestyle at a reference value. Let us
say that we focus on one speciﬁc curve (say, we put e h ≡ hB). We will then measure the
inequality in the distances between this curve and the horizontal line x.6 These distances
are contained in the striped area in the Figure. It is obvious that this procedure does
not satisfy the compensation condition: indeed we fully neglect the unfairness which
is implicit and (in this case larger) for lifestyle hA. On the other hand, the procedure
satisﬁes condition 1, since the only health diﬀerences reﬂected in the inequality measure
by construction are due to diﬀerences in income.
6Given that we focus on absolute inequality measures, the exact position of line x does not matter, as
long as it is horizontal.
10When we calculate the fairness gap,w eﬁx y at a given level (say y∗) and we compute
for each individual the diﬀerence between his actual health and the health level that he
would reach with his actual lifestyle in the hypothetical situation that he had income y∗.
These distances are contained in the shaded areas in the Figure. Note that condition 2 is
now satisﬁed: all individuals are taken into account and the fairness gap will only be zero
if both health curves are horizontal. However, the fairness gap also takes into account
t h ef a c tt h a tt h es l o p e so ft h ec u r v e shA and hB are diﬀerent, while we ideally would like
to neutralize the eﬀect of life style diﬀerences, and, hence, the diﬀerences in the slopes.
Therefore, the fairness gap does not satisfy condition 1. Both approaches lead to the
same result if the only diﬀerence between hA and hB is a vertical shift. This is the case
of additive separability.
Note that we basically propose to use the standard apparatus of inequality mea-
surement to the corrected health outcomes or to the individual fairness gaps: we do
not work with concentration curves, as is the dominant procedure in the literature on
socioeconomic inequalities in health. There are two reasons for this. First, the use of
concentration curves is only possible if one considers inequality in one dimension (e.g.
income) with a natural ordering which can be used to construct the concentration curves.
Our approach allows for many legitimate and illegitimate variables. Second, even if one
only considered socioeconomic inequalities we still think that there are severe limitations
to the use of concentration curves. In the following sections, we will come back to these
issues more explicitly.
3 A sketch of a structural model
Fairness does not only relate to socioeconomic inequalities. Some variables inﬂuencing
health or health care can be considered to be legitimate, others are ethically objectionable
sources of diﬀerences. Moreover, as the simple example in the previous section has shown,
the empirical interactions between these diﬀerent variables may have a crucial inﬂuence on
the inequality measurement. It is therefore necessary to have a structural model in mind
when thinking about speciﬁc measures of unfair inequality. Starting from a structural
11model makes it possible to close part of the gap between the large health economics
literature on explaining health and health care diﬀerences and the normative literature
on unfair inequalities. In this section we will organize our thinking by introducing such a
structural model in very general terms. Of course, many simpliﬁcations are needed if one
wants to apply the model to real empirical data. We will return to this issue in section 5.
We state that the health level hi of individual i is produced by a health technology
H(.), which can be written as follows
hi = H(mi,c i,e i,ε i,o i,s i) (2)
where mi is a vector of medical consumption (e.g. the number of GP visits, the number
of specialist visits, pharmaceutical consumption and so on), ci is a vector of consumption
goods, including life style goods (smoking, drinking, physical activities), oi is a vector of
job characteristics (including leisure), and si is social background. We therefore leave open
the possibility that, in addition to life style and job characteristics, there is also a direct
eﬀect of social background on health. Further crucial variables are ei, the genetically
determined health endowment, and εi, which is a (stochastic) health shock. The health
technology, as described in (2), is determined mainly by biological considerations and
is objectively given to the individual. However, individual behavior has an inﬂuence on
health through the choices of mi,c i and oi.
Labour income yi is endogenous and is determined through a mixture of endowments
and choice variables:
yi = Y (ci,o i,h i,a i,s i) (3)
where ai is the innate productive capacity of the individual, for which she cannot be
held responsible. Earnings capacities are also inﬂuenced by the present health status of
the individual. Individual choices of leisure and job characteristics oi will endogenously
determine gross labour income yi. Note that we again include social background explicitly:
this is meant to capture not only the eﬀect of discriminatory practices by employers, but
also the diﬀerences in the quality of the social networks that are available to various
individuals and that will inﬂuence their search behavior and their ﬁnal outcomes.
12To model the individual choices of mi,c i and oi, we assume that individuals maximize
a utility function Ui(mi,c i,o i,h i).7 We thus assume that mi enters the utility function
directly. With this we want to capture the idea that individuals may have speciﬁct a s t e s
about medical care consumption, for which they can (perhaps) be held responsible. They
also care for their health. However, the health production function (2) is not perfectly
known to individuals and there may also be diﬀerences between social groups in this
respect. Representing the information available to individual i by Ii, we explicitly deﬁne
her "perceived" health production function as
hi = b H(mi,c i,e i,ε i,o i,s i;Ii) (4)
and we assume that choices are based on this perceived health production function.
Individuals maximize their utility under a budget constraint, which we write as
pci + B(mi,r i)=yi − T(yi,c i) − ρ(ri,e i) (5)
where yi is income, T(yi,c i) gives taxes paid (or transfers received) as a function of
labour income and consumption, and p are the consumption prices. To arrive at a general
description of the health ﬁnancing constraints, we introduce two additional functions. The
ﬁrst (B(mi,r i)) gives the out-of-pocket payments. These are dependent on the level (and
structure) of medical care consumption and on the degree of supplementary insurance
coverage ri. The form of the function B(.) is determined by the health care system in
which the individual lives. In a National Health Service-system where all expenditures are
taken care of by the government and there are no co-payments or deductibles, the value of
B(mi,r i) can be zero. If individuals take supplementary insurance, they will have to pay
ap r e m i u mρ(ri,e i): the premium amount will depend on the degree of insurance coverage
ri, and on a private insurance market with premium diﬀerentiation it will also depend
on the genetic health endowment ei. Buying supplementary insurance is an individual
decision, taken at an earlier stage.8
7This (ordinal) utility function is to be interpreted as the representation of a preference ordering <i
for individual i. In section 6 we will argue that we do not assume that subjective utility is cardinally
measurable or interpersonally comparable.
8This assumption of a two stage decision-making process is only made for convenience. However, it
13In addition, while individuals have some freedom in their choice of health care con-
sumption, it is generally accepted that they are restricted by the decisions taken by health
care professionals. The behavior of the providers will be inﬂuenced by the characteristics
of the health care system, more speciﬁcally by the way in which they are remunerated.
Moreover, in many countries there is huge interregional variation in the availability of
health care services. This acts as a kind of quantity rationing constraint. We will summa-
rize these supply side inﬂuences by saying that an individual i can only choose his medical
consumption vector mi from a restricted choice set M, the shape of which is determined
by supply side variables zi, by his health endowments ei and the stochastic shock εi,b y
his level of supplementary insurance coverage and by his social background:
mi ∈ M(zi,e i,ε i,r i,s i) (6)
Note that eq. (6) captures restrictions on choice determined by the supply side, not the
choice behavior of the individuals themselves. The inﬂuence of social background and
supplementary insurance coverage in (6) refers to the situation in which providers diﬀer-
entiate their behavior according to the social background of the individual or according
to whether they have supplementary insurance or not (e.g. in the situation where they
can raise additional supplementary fees from patients with a supplementary insurance).
In the extreme case where individual patients had no freedom of choice at all, the set M
reduces to a singleton, and medical care consumption is fully determined by the providers.
We can now summarize our stylized model of individual behavior as follows. In a
ﬁrst stage, individuals choose to take supplementary insurance or not. This decision will
be inﬂuenced by their health and income prospects (aﬀected by ei and ai respectively)
and by their time and risk preferences Ri. Moreover, we know that the information about
insurance opportunities is unequally distributed over the population and that some social
groups might ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to buy insurance than others. Rather than modelling
this decision process explicitly, we summarize it by the following reduced form speciﬁca-
seemed important to us to introduce supplementary insurance into the model, because it also plays an
important role in recent attempts to explain inequity in delivery (see e.g. Jones et al., 2006).
14tion:
ri = Θ
R(Ri,e i,a i,s i) (7)
In a second stage individuals decide about (mi,o i,c i) by maximizing individual utility
Ui(mi,c i,o i,h i) under the budget constraint (5), the information constraint (4), and the
supply-side constraint (6). The resulting behavior can be expressed as a function of the
exogenous individual characteristics as follows:
mi = m(si,a i,e i,ε i,z i,I i,R i,U i) (8)
oi = o(si,a i,e i,ε i,z i,I i,R i,U i) (9)
ci = c(si,a i,e i,ε i,z i,I i,R i,U i) (10)
The values of health, of income and of achieved welfare are endogenously determined.
Introducing the decision variables in the utility function, in eq. (2) and in eq. (3) we get
the following reduced form expressions:
hi = H
R(si,a i,e i,ε i,z i,I i,R i,U i) (11)
yi = Y
R(si,a i,e i,ε i,z i,I i,R i,U i) (12)
ui = U
R(si,a i,e i,ε i,z i,I i,R i,U i) (13)
Hidden behind these reduced form expressions (8)-(13) are market characteristics
(deﬁning p and the shape of the functions ρ(.) in (5) and Y (.) in (3)) and policy variables
(the shape of the functions B(.) and T(.) in the budget constraint (5)). The supply eﬀects
on medical care consumption in (6) can be seen as resulting from a mixture of market
forces and policy decisions. Evaluating the inequality in medical care consumption (8), in
h e a l t h( 1 1 )a n di nw e l f a r e( 1 3 )t h e ni n d e e db o i l sd o w nt oa ne v a l u a t i o no ft h ew h o l es o c i a l
structure. The advantage of the reduced form expressions is that they neatly distinguish
diﬀerent exogenously given characteristics of the individuals. At the same time, consid-
ering the whole structural model clearly shows where and how these characteristics enter
the analysis. This is of crucial importance to decide whether these characteristics should
be treated as legitimate or illegitimate sources of interpersonal diﬀerences in health and
health care.
15In the following section, we will start from this structural model to give a more explicit
content to the notions of direct unfairness and of the fairness gap in the context of health
and health care. To simplify the notation, we will group the exogenous characteristics
in the reduced form equations in ﬁve groups: health endowments (also indicating health
care needs) N = {e,ε}, social background variables S =( a,s), individual preferences
P =( R,U), available information I and supply-side variables z.
4 Unfair inequalities in health and in health care
Unfair inequalities in health care (or "horizontal inequity" in health care delivery) relate
to the distribution of m in the population. There are many diﬀerent approaches to
the concept (see e.g. Hurley, 2000; Wagstaﬀ and van Doorslaer, 2000a; Williams and
Cookson, 2000 for surveys). In this paper we do not want to go deeply in that conceptual
and ethical debate. We want to show, however, that the most important arguments can be
reinterpreted within a framework with legitimate and illegitimate causes of inequalities.
T h es a m ei st r u ef o ri n e q u a l i t yi nh e a l t h .
We will ﬁrst analyze unfair inequalities in health care under the assumption that m
can be treated as a scalar variable. We will then discuss the speciﬁc questions linked to
the fact that health care consumption is better seen as a vector. Finally, we discuss unfair
inequalities in health.
4.1 Unfair inequalities in health care
Let us start from eq. (8) and indicate how diﬀerent approaches to equity in health care
delivery can be interpreted in terms of the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
sources of inequalities:
• there seems to be almost general consensus that for given N, P, I and z,d i ﬀerences
in S should not lead to diﬀerences in health care consumption. This is the basic issue
of socioeconomic inequality, which has dominated the health economics literature;
16• ad i ﬀerent but related stream of literature has focused on supply-induced inequal-
ities. Again, there seems to be near consensus that given N, P, I and S, individ-
uals cannot be held responsible for supply-side inﬂuences, and that diﬀerences in z
should therefore not lead to diﬀerences in health care consumption. If we interpret
z in terms of the regional distribution of health care resources, we recover here the
problem of regional inequities in health care;
• for given P, S, I and z,d i ﬀerences in N lead to legitimate (and desirable) diﬀerences.
Note that we are considering here only the issue of horizontal equity and ignore
vertical equity, which would consist in checking whether the observed diﬀerences
in health care consumption are an ethically appropriate reaction to diﬀerences in
health care needs. We take for granted the existing relationship between health care
consumption and N9;
• there is more discussion about the relevance of diﬀerences in P and I. This question
indeed brings us right into the debate between proponents of equality of use, equal-
ity of access, and equality of informed access. In the past, there have been some
heated exchanges of opinions in this respect. As an example, after the initial paper
by Wagstaﬀ et al. (1991) about equity in delivery, there was a sharp reply (Mooney
et al., 1991) pointing to the importance of equality of access rather than use.10 Pro-
ponents of equality of access emphasized that individuals can (and should) be held
responsible for their preferences and their information. Proponents of equality of use
explicitly rejected responsibility for both preferences and information. An interme-
diate position (that of equality of informed access) holds individuals responsible for
their personal choices, if these are based on good information. We can summarize
these diﬀerent views in our notation. Emphasizing equality of access means that
given N, S,a n dz,d i ﬀerences in P and I lead to unproblematic (legitimate) diﬀer-
9See Sutton (2002) for an explicit analysis of vertical inequity.
10Another example is Goddard and Smith (2001). These authors discuss the issue of equality of access
in a broad setting and with a general approach which is close to ours (including the speciﬁcation of a
structural model and the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate causes of diﬀerences).
17ences. Emphasizing equality of use boils down to including both P and I among the
illegitimate sources of variation. Equality of informed access holds people respon-
sible for P but not for I. In fact, the methodology we propose can accommodate
all three approaches and allows to compare the results, i.e. to identify the part of
inequality which is due to preference variation and to variation in information.
In this paper we only want to describe a speciﬁc methodology to implement the
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate reasons for diﬀerences, without taking a
speciﬁc position on where exactly to draw the dividing line. For the sake of the argument,
however, we will further on treat N and P as legitimate sources of diﬀerences, and S, I
and z as illegitimate sources of diﬀerences.
We can now apply the main concepts from section 2 to eq. (8). To compute the
degree of direct unfairness,w eﬁrst remove legitimate diﬀerences (due to diﬀerences
in N and P)b yﬁxing these to a reference value. We then apply the traditional appa-
ratus of (absolute) Lorenz curves and (absolute) inequality measurement to the vector
f mi = m(S, e N,z,I, e P), i.e. the variation in medical expenditures which remains after all
legitimate sources of variation are kept constant.11 To compute the fairness gap,w eﬁrst
deﬁne an "ideal" solution, i.e. a situation in which all the illegitimate sources of variation
have been removed, as m∗
i = m(S∗,N,z∗,I∗,P). We then apply the traditional appa-
ratus of (absolute) Lorenz curves and (absolute) inequality measurement to the vector
(mi − m∗
i).
As shown before, these two approaches will in general yield diﬀerent results, unless the
health care consumption function is additively separable in the legitimate and illegitimate
variables. Which of the two is then preferable? Remember ﬁr s tt h a td i r e c tu n f a i r n e s s
does not satisfy the compensation condition 2 - it may get a zero value even if there
are illegitimate diﬀerences left. This seems to be a decisive weakness. The fairness gap
approach does satisfy the compensation condition. However, it does not satisfy condition
11The results in general will depend on the choice of the reference values ( e N and e P for direct unfairness,
S∗,I∗ and z∗ for the fairness gap). It is natural to choose average values in the population as reference,
but other possibilities may also be considered, e.g. the choice of an "eﬃcient" level of z for the reference
value z∗.





Figure 2: Socio-economic background and preference diﬀerences
1 and may also take up inequalities due to needs and preferences, if these interact with
socioeconomic background and information and supply side variables. The problem was
sketched in Figure 1. In order to avoid confusion, that Figure is repeated here for the
context of health care consumption as Figures 2 and 3.
Look ﬁr s ta tF i g u r e2 . I nt h a tﬁgure we distinguish two preference groups. The
fairness gap will take up into the inequality measure that the relationship between so-
cial background and health care consumption is stronger for preference group A than for
preference group B. This goes against condition 1 (no inﬂuence of legitimate diﬀerences),
if individuals are held responsible for their own preferences (after controlling for all the
other variables that appear in the structural model). Or, looked at from another angle:
with a uniform distribution of individuals, the fairness gap suggests that the contribu-
tion of preference group A to overall unfair inequality is larger than the contribution of
preference group B, although these diﬀerences are only due to preference variables for
which individuals are held responsible. But look now at Figure 3. This is exactly the
same, except that we now interpret the two curves as corresponding to diﬀerent needs
groups. Again, the fairness gap will take into account that the relationship between social





Figure 3: Socio-economic background and diﬀerences in needs
background and health care consumption is stronger for one needs group than for the
other and will therefore take up diﬀerences in consumption reﬂecting diﬀerences in needs.
However, in this case the ethical implications are quite diﬀerent, because individuals are
not responsible for the needs curve which is relevant to them - needs reﬂect diﬀerences
in health endowments or health shocks. It therefore makes perfect sense to claim that
the interaction between the eﬀect of needs and of socioeconomic background should be
taken up in the measure of unfair inequality. There seem to be good normative reasons
to prefer the fairness gap to the direct unfairness approach.
4.2 How to aggregate use?
In the previous subsection we provisionally adopted the assumption that health care
consumption can be seen as a scalar variable. We therefore sidestepped the aggregation
problem: how to aggregate such diverse items as visits to a general practitioner and
regular hospital dialysis? One approach could be to calculate unfair inequality for each of
the items separately. The Ecuity-project (see, e.g. van Doorslaer et al., 2000) has shown
20that this may lead to intriguing results: one of these is the rather common ﬁnding in
many countries of "pro-poor" inequity for general practitioners and "pro-rich" inequity
for specialists. However, this disaggregated approach implies a very strict interpretation
of equality of use, which seems unreasonable given that there are obvious substitution
possibilities between the various health care items. Moreover, it does not allow to arrive
at an overall evaluation of equity. For this purpose, we have to aggregate the diﬀerent
items in one way or another.12
G i v e nt h a tw ea r ef o c u s i n go nt h ef a i ru s eo fresources, the most natural aggregator is
the global opportunity cost of the health care resources used by the individual.13 Although
this approach is natural, it still is useful to interpret it in terms of the distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate inequality. Indeed, the use of this aggregator implies that there
are no unfair inequalities in health care left if there are no unfair inequalities in overall
health care resources used. Individuals are then held responsible for the allocation of the
total resources over the diﬀerent items. A relatively larger use of emergency services in
the hospital can (from the point of view of equity) compensate for a relatively smaller
number of preventive visits to a doctor.
To see the consequences of this, let us go back to the structural model and consider the
diﬀerent variables inﬂuencing health care consumption m.I fd i ﬀerences in the composition
of m are motivated by diﬀerences in the "objective" health production function (2), they
may be desirable. If they reﬂect diﬀerences in preferences, we are back in the discussion
about equality of use and equality of access that was introduced before. If one holds
individuals responsible for diﬀerences in P, the resulting diﬀerences in the composition
of m are unproblematic. However, diﬀerent choices by the patients may also reﬂect
diﬀerences in I and therefore in the perceived health technology (4), or diﬀerences in the
supply side mechanism (6). As argued already before, it would be diﬃcult to state that
individual patients are responsible for supply-side features (e.g. the density of specialists
12A possible alternative, which to the best of our knowledge has not yet really been explored in the
literature, would be the construction of multidimensional inequality measures.
13In this spirit, the Ecuity-project (van Doorslaer et al., 1992, 2000) has focused on imputed expendi-
tures, computed as volumes times average imputed cost.
21in low-income versus high-income areas). There can be more debate about responsibility
for information, but it seems reasonable to accept that informational diﬀerences are due,
at least partly, to factors that are beyond individual responsibility.
All this suggests that we should care about inequalities in the composition of m,e v e n
with no inequality in the total amount of resources used, if these diﬀerences in composition
lead to diﬀerences in the quality of treatment. If people get treatment of diﬀerent quality
because of factors for which they cannot be held responsible, it is diﬃcult to maintain that
there would be no "unfair inequality in health care". We therefore propose an alternative
aggregator which takes into account the eﬀect of treatment on health. The basic idea is
introduced in Figure 4. Suppose we consider two health care items: GP visits and visits
to a specialist, and we start in a hypothetical situation where there would be equality
of use between group A (say, the rich) and group B (say, the poor), if equality of use is
interpreted in terms of the global opportunity cost of the resources of health care for A
and for B. This global opportunity cost is given by the "budget" line CC’. Suppose also,
for the sake of the argument, that the objective health production technology is the same
for A and for B and is represented by the iso-health curves in Figure 4. Group A consumes
more specialist services and therefore reaches a higher iso-health curve than group B.14
Or, formulated in another way, the health care resources are used in a less eﬃcient way
by B if eﬃciency is deﬁned in terms of health "production". Let us assume that the
"choice" of B reﬂects poorer information (or supply-side discrimination) and that B is
not held responsible for her lower eﬃciency. An attractive possibility is then to deﬁne for
each individual the minimum health care budget, needed to bring her at the health level
she has reached with her actual health care consumption. In Figure 4 this is the budget
represented by DD’ for the rich and the budget represented by EE’ for the poor. We can
then apply the whole measurement apparatus described in the previous section to these
"minimal eﬃcient budgets".
The concept of "minimal eﬃcient budgets" may be hard to implement because its
measurement for any particular individual should theoretically depend on this individ-
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Figure 4: The minimal eﬃcient budget
23ual’s characteristics, as can be seen from eq. (2). With this aggregator, equation (8) may
also be hard to estimate because individual preferences may aﬀect the value of the min-
imal eﬃcient budget not only through quantitative demand behavior, but also through
qualitative demand inﬂuencing the composition of m.
The basic idea underlying this aggregator is that what ultimately matters is the im-
pact of medical care on health, not the expenditure as such. To take an extreme example,
a patient receiving useless treatments is not viewed as getting a favor in the metric of
minimal eﬃcient budgets. In this light, our proposal is perfectly in line with the idea
of Culyer and Wagstaﬀ (1993) that what basically matters is health. This immediately
brings us to a potential point of criticism. The shift from "budgets" to "minimal eﬃcient
budgets" moves us away from the basic intuitions about "equity in delivery" and in the
direction of equal health. To some extent, it erodes the relevance of looking at equity in
delivery. Unfair inequalities in health are the topic of the next subsection.
4.3 Unfair inequalities in health
T h em o s tc o n v i n c i n gj u s t i ﬁcation to strive for equity in health care delivery seems to be
a concern for equity in health, combined with the belief that health care contributes to
a better health. A separate treatment of equity in delivery may be useful, because it
allows for an evaluation of a speciﬁc domain of government policy. However, removing
unfair inequalities in health care is not suﬃcient to remove unfair inequalities in health.
It therefore remains necessary to calculate unfair inequalities in health, too.
Unfair inequalities in health can be analyzed starting from the reduced form equation
(11). Again diﬀerent ethical conceptions will lead to diﬀerent views about where to draw
the boundary line between legitimate and illegitimate variables in (11):
• there is hardly any debate about the idea that given N, I and P,d i ﬀerences in z and
S should not lead to diﬀerences in health status. It is generally accepted that these
diﬀerences are induced by social arrangements or by policy, and that they are there-
fore avoidable and hence unfair. The literature about socioeconomic inequalities in
health (i.e. inequalities related to diﬀerences in S) is especially impressive.
24• as argued before, there are also good reasons to include information I among the
illegitimate causes of health diﬀerences.
• t h e r ei sm u c hm o r ed e b a t ea b o u tt h ec l a s s i ﬁcation of the preference variables P.T h e
debate is somewhat confused because it often starts from the empirical ﬁnding that
a large part of socioeconomic inequalities in health is due to diﬀerences in lifestyle
(smoking, alcohol consumption, nutritional equilibrium) and therefore focuses upon
the statistical correlation between P and S. We will come back to this issue of
statistical correlation in the next section. The question we raise here is diﬀerent: do
diﬀerences in P lead to legitimate health diﬀerences under the condition that S, z,
I and N are ﬁxed? To make the question more speciﬁc: if within one social group
there are diﬀerences in health which can be traced back completely to diﬀerences in
smoking behavior, are then these diﬀerences in health unfair?
• in our view, there is surprisingly little debate about the question whether diﬀerences
in N lead to "unfair" inequalities in health, conditional on given values for P, z, I
and S. In fact, it seems to be almost generally accepted that the variables in N
are biological characteristics (genetic endowments or stochastic shocks) which are
n o tc a u s e db yt h es o c i a ls t r u c t u r e ,a n dc a n n o te v e nb em o d i ﬁed by social policies -
and are therefore not unfair. It is argued, e.g., that diﬀerences in health related to
age cannot be unfair because they are a fact of life, or that innate handicaps do not
lead to unfair health diﬀerences because they are unavoidable.15 We agree that it
makes sense to focus on avoidable diﬀerences for policy analysis. We would argue,
however, that "unfair" does not necessarily coincide with "avoidable" and that it is
also useful to calculate a broad notion of unfairness, which includes diﬀerences in
unavoidable factors and even diﬀerences in unavoidable consequences. Suppose an
unavoidable natural disaster hits a given region. Are the induced welfare losses to be
called fair because the natural disaster was an unavoidable cause? Are the welfare
losses which cannot be remedied to be called fair because they are unavoidable
15In the same spirit, Gravelle (2003) makes the distinction between what he calls "policy irrelevant"
or standardizing variables and "policy-relevant" variables.
25consequences of the disaster? It is sometimes objected against a broad notion of
unfairness that reducing the unfairness due to inequality in health would require
lowering the health of the healthy. This is of course not desirable. Yet, reducing
the unfairness due to health inequality does not necessarily mean that one has to
lower the health level of the healthy: one can also go beyond the health domain,
and compensate the lower health level of sick persons by a better result on other
dimensions (e.g. income). In order to evaluate or to stimulate these policies a broad
measure of unfair health inequality is useful. Moreover, what are avoidable or policy-
relevant diﬀerences in health is not always clear and will change over time. Some
diseases which were incurable a few decades ago can now well be treated. Would
one not be willing to draw the conclusion that this implies that unfair inequality in
health has decreased over time? Similarly, should we not consider improvements in
the treatment of ageing as reducing undesirable inequalities between individuals of
diﬀerent ages? We therefore need a measure which is able to capture these changes
and these diﬀerences.16
While we therefore think that it is preferable to include N among the illegitimate
rather than among the legitimate sources of inequality, the methods we propose allow for
both options. And the same is true for diﬀerent opinions about P. Let us again for the
sake of the argument accept that diﬀerences in S, N, I and z lead to unfair inequalities
in health, while health diﬀerences following from diﬀerences in P are no cause of concern.
We then can apply our basic concepts in the health sphere. To compute the degree
of direct unfairness of the health distribution, we remove legitimate diﬀerences
(due to diﬀerences in P)b yﬁxing these to a reference value, and we apply the traditional
apparatus of (absolute) Lorenz curves and (absolute) inequality measurement to the vector
e hi = HR(S,N,z,I, e P), i.e. the variation in health which remains after preferences are
kept constant. To compute the health fairness gap,w eﬁrst deﬁne an "ideal" situation,
i.e. a situation in which all the illegitimate sources of variation have been removed, as
16A particularly tricky example of diﬀerences in genetic endowments is that of gender diﬀerences in
health and mortality. See, e.g., Tsuchiya and Williams (2005).
26h∗
i = HR(S∗,N∗,z∗,I∗,P), and we apply the traditional apparatus of (absolute) Lorenz
curves and (absolute) inequality measurement to the vector (hi−h∗
i). The two approaches
will yield the same results if the function HR(.) is additively separable in the legitimate and
the illegitimate variables. In general, the health fairness gap will satisfy the compensation
condition, but may include some eﬀects of P. The direct unfairness approach does not
satisfy the compensation condition, i.e. it can yield a value of zero even if there are still
health diﬀerences between individuals with identical preferences.
Our approach bears some similarity with the proposal made by Bommier and Stecklov
(2002). These authors write that in an equitable situation, "we should expect two individ-
uals with equivalent health endowments to reach the same health level, regardless of their
socioeconomic status" (p. 503). This is basically a reformulation of our compensation
condition in the case where inequalities due to health endowments are unavoidable and
therefore do not lead to unfairness (a position Bommier and Stecklov explicitly support).
They implement this ethical starting point through the requirement that "the expectation
of actual health given social background, E(hi|Si), should be equal to the average health
level in the society, E(hi), and therefore independent of income" (p. 505),17 and more
speciﬁcally propose to draw the Lorenz curve for this variable E(hi|Si).T h e i r f o c u s o n
social background (and on social background only) implies that diﬀerences in inequality
following from diﬀerences in P, N, I and z are all considered to be legitimate. If these
variables are not explicitly included in the estimations, the measure of socioeconomic in-
equality will be biased, as we will argue in the next sections. Moreover, even allowing for
this, drawing the Lorenz curve for E(hi|Si) is not identical to drawing the Lorenz curve
for e hi = HR(S, e N,e z, e I, e P). Yet, the inspiration of Bommier and Stecklov is very similar to
our idea of direct unfairness: it is easily seen that the Bommier-Stecklov-approach does
not satisfy the compensation condition, despite their claim to the contrary.
17Bommier and Stecklov (2002) propose to work with E(hi|yi), but we substituted social background
for (endogenous) income in line with the approach followed in this paper.
275 Towards empirical application
Empirical application of the concepts we p r o p o s ei sv e r ye a s yi np r i n c i p l e .T h eﬁrst step
is the estimation of a structural model, as described in section 3. The best available
econometric techniques can be used, because increasing the complexity of the empirical
model does not increase to the same extent the complexity of the normative exercise.
What ﬁnally matters for the latter are the reduced form expressions (8) and (11) - and
the hypothetical values used in the calculation of direct unfairness or the fairness gap can
be calculated with simulation techniques if necessary. In fact, we believe that the clear
distinction between on the one hand the descriptive (or explanatory) step of estimating
the best econometric model which is possible with the available data, and on the other
hand the normative step of calculating unfair inequalities is an important advantage of
our approach. It has become usual practice in the literature to compute ﬁrst an index
of socioeconomic inequality and then in a second step to decompose this index in order
to get a better insight into the causes of the inequality (see, e.g., Wagstaﬀ et al., 2003;
van Doorslaer et al., 2004; van Doorslaer and Koolman, 2004). Linear approximations
are needed to keep this decomposition feasible. Moreover, the decomposition approach
focuses on a reduced form without the possibility of deriving additional insights from
a theoretically acceptable structural model. In a certain sense, such an approach clips
the wings of the econometricians to ﬁt them into the normative straitjacket. Nothing of
this kind is needed in our approach. The eﬀect on unfair inequality of policy changes or
hypothetical changes in the environment can be calculated through simulation with the
full-ﬂedged structural model.
While the empirical economists are completely free to estimate the best structural
model possible, there are important normative questions which should be considered when
going from the estimated model to the calculation of inequality. We will ﬁrst discuss some
of these questions. We will then show the link between our approach and the traditional
methods of direct and indirect standardization.18
18The discussion parallels the application to risk adjustment in Schokkaert and Van de Voorde (2004,
2007).
285.1 Normative choices
Although the normative analysis can in principle start from a sophisticated empirical
analysis, for our purposes it is suﬃcient to illustrate the issues with a simple linear ex-
ample. The points we raise are equally relevant for the topics of equity in health care
and equity in health, but we will illustrate them for health care. Neglecting measurement
issues and taking all the variables, including m, as scalars for the sake of simplicity, we
consider a situation in which eq. (8) takes the following simple form:
mi = α + βSi + γzi + δNi + ηSiNi + ui (14)
in which ui is a disturbance term. If η =0 , eq. (14) is additively separable.
To apply the concepts from the previous section, one ﬁrst has to decide for each
variable in the model whether it is a legitimate or an illegitimate source of diﬀerences. As
described before, diﬀerent decisions will reﬂect diﬀerent views about equity in health care.
Let us in line with what was done before assume that S and z are illegitimate sources
of inequality and that N is a legitimate source of inequality. There then remains the
crucial problem of interpreting the disturbance term, however. A natural interpretation
would be to say that ui reﬂects individual idiosyncrasies and therefore mainly individual
preferences P and information I. In this interpretation, theories of equality of access
would include the disturbance in the list of legitimate sources of inequality, while theories
of equality of use would still see it as an illegitimate cause of diﬀerences. An approach in
terms of inequality of informed access would take an intermediate position. This choice
makes a crucial diﬀerence. In the equality-of-access interpretation direct unfairness would
measure the inequality in the vector (βSi + γzi + ηSi e N), while the fairness gap would
consider inequality in the vector (βSi + γzi + ηNi(Si − S∗)).19 In the equality-of-use
interpretation ui should be added to both these expressions, which can then be rewritten
as (mi − δNi + ηSi( e N − Ni)) and (mi − Ni(δ + ηS∗)) respectively.
19Note that we omitted all constant terms from these expressions. Since we follow in this paper an
absolute approach to inequality measurement, these constants are irrelevant because of the translation
invariance.
29The issue gets even more complicated, because in all real-world applications the dis-
turbance term will not only reﬂect individual preference and informational idiosyncrasies
but also the eﬀects of measurement errors and omitted variables - and the errors and
omissions will relate to both legitimate and illegitimate sources of inequalities.20 In fact,
the safest procedure seems to be to calculate unfair inequalities in both cases, i.e. with
and without ui included. The results could then be interpreted as giving an upper and
a lower boundary to unfair inequality respectively. In any case the important message is
that it is necessary to think explicitly about the interpretation of the disturbance term.21
A second general question refers to the choice of the reference values in the calculation
of direct unfairness and of the fairness gap. A natural choice is to choose the mean values
in the sample, but this choice is not innocuous and will inﬂuence the results. It seems
advisable to perform sensitivity analysis for diﬀerent reference values.22
A third general point is obvious. In the approach we propose it is important to
estimate the best structural model possible and it would make no sense to deliberately
omit some variables from the estimated model, because this could induce omitted variables
bias. Suppose for instance that one is mainly interested in socioeconomic inequality, and
that one would omit from eq. (14) the variable z related to supply-side diﬀerences. If there
is a correlation between z and S (as may be expected) the estimate of β -a n dt h e r e f o r e
the estimates of unfair inequality will be biased. The problem of omitted variables bias
is even more obvious if one estimated eq. (14) with the variable S omitted, as used to
20An obvious example of a legitimate source of diﬀerences entering into the disturbance terms would
be the stochastic health shocks εi.
21In this respect model (14) may be misleadingly simple, in that the disturbance term is additively
separable from all the explanatory variables in the model. As soon as one turns to more elaborate
statistical speciﬁcations, this is no longer necessarily true - and the conﬂict between the two conditions
from section 2 will involve the disturbance term too.
22Gravelle (2003) discusses the case of what he calls "essential non-linearity". This boils down to the
absence of additive separability. He also advocates the use of mean values, and indicates that the results
depend on this choice. In the context of income distribution, Luttens and Van de gaer (2007) show some
interesting theoretical results about the consequences of choosing diﬀerent reference values. Some of their
results are dependent on the speciﬁc model they use, however. More theoretical work along these lines
would certainly be useful.
30b et h ec a s ei nt h ee a r l yw o r ko ne q u i t yi nd e l i v e r y . 23 We will come back to this when we
discuss the relationship with direct and indirect standardization.
Correlation between legitimate and illegitimate variables raises not only statistical
issues, however (see, e.g. the analysis of Roemer, 1998, 2002). Let us consider the example
of a life style variable (e.g. smoking). If people are not to be held responsible for their
socioeconomic background, can they then be held responsible for their smoking behavior,
if this behavior turns out to be very highly correlated with (and therefore perhaps caused
by) their social background? In our opinion, the only adequate way to tackle this diﬃcult
issue is the construction of good structural models of behavior, which in principle should
create the possibility to disentangle the social class and the pure lifestyle eﬀect. This issue
is related to the deeper question that one might be willing to argue that in some cases
individuals are "partly" responsible for their health or health care outcomes. This would
make it diﬃcult to interpret the resulting diﬀerences unequivocally as either legitimate
or illegitimate. We think that such intuitions of partial responsibility reﬂect the fact that
some variables work through diﬀerent channels or result from the interplay of diﬀerent
underlying mechanisms (some of which are unobservable). In our view, disentangling the
diﬀerent structural mechanisms is a necessary prerequisite to evaluate in a meaningful
way the degree to which individuals can be held responsible. This is precisely one of the
main reasons to build ﬁrst a structural model rather than immediately focusing on the
reduced form.
5.2 Direct and indirect standardization
Both in the literature on equity in delivery (Wagstaﬀand van Doorslaer, 2000a, 2000b) and
on equity in health (Gravelle, 2003) an explicit link has been made between diﬀerent cal-
culation methods and the methods of direct and indirect standardization. While Wagstaﬀ
and van Doorslaer (2000b) argue in favour of the indirect standardization method, Grav-
elle (2003) takes the opposite position and claims that this method leads to inconsistent
23The recent work takes into account the problem of omitted variables bias - see, e.g., the discussion
in van Doorslaer et al. (2004) and Van Ourti (2004).
31estimates. Our approach oﬀers some additional insights into this issue. Note that all these
authors work with concentration instead of inequality indices: we come back to that issue
in the next section, but it is not essential for our discussion at this stage.
F i r s t ,t h ed i r e c ts t a n d a r d i z a t i o nm e t h o di se x a c t l ya n a l o g o u st ow h a tw eh a v ec a l l e d
direct unfairness, if one takes the mean value of the legitimate variables as the reference
value to calculate e m or e h.24
Second, there is also a clear link between the method of indirect standardization and
the fairness gap, but here we have to be careful. The traditional approach to indirect
standardization (see, e.g., van Doorslaer et al., 2000) is ﬁrst to run a regression with the
legitimate (or "standardizing") variables only, i.e. estimate a model
mi = ρ + ζNi + ei (15)
and then to compute the inequality in (mi−ζNi).25. If the true model is (14), estimating
eq. (15) will lead to a biased estimate of the eﬀect of the needs variable on medical
expenditure, if there is non-zero correlation between on the one hand N and on the other
hand z and S. This is the basic insight underlying the statements of Gravelle (2003)
about the inconsistency of indirect standardization. In some cases the consequences of
this are quite dramatic. Suppose that health endowments are lower in regions with a
lower supply of doctors and that a lower supply of doctors leads to lower expenditures:
then the estimate of ζ in (15) will be an underestimate of the true value δ in eq. (14).
Suppose now that there is also a positive correlation between health endowments and
socioeconomic background. Then the simple method of indirect standardization will in
24Wagstaﬀ and van Doorslaer (2000b) claim that the method of direct standardization requires the use
of grouped data. As Gravelle (2003) has already argued, this claim is mistaken and there is no problem
to do direct standardization with individual data. In fact, a model with separate utilisation equations
per income group, can easily be rewritten as one general model with a full set of cross-eﬀects between
income and the needs variables included.
25We again leave out all the constant terms, which are irrelevant in our absolute approach to measure-
ment. Note also that in any application all the theoretical coeﬃcients in these expressions have to be
replaced with estimates. Moreover, remember that in some non-linear speciﬁcations it is not always the
case that E(ei)=0 .
32general lead to an underestimation of the "justiﬁed" health care expenditures of those
from lower socioeconomic background - and therefore also to an underestimation of unfair
socioeconomic inequality.
However, it is obvious that one can easily solve this problem by estimating the full
model (14) (see, e.g. van Doorslaer et al., 2004). The method of the fairness gap, i.e.
putting all the illegitimate variables equal to a reference value and then calculating the
inequality in (mi − m∗
i), is completely analogous to the basic idea of indirect standard-
ization but takes care of the omitted variables bias that would be induced by estimating
(15).
With this extension of the idea of indirect standardization, the choice between direct
and indirect standardization boils down to the choice between calculating direct unfair-
ness and the fairness gap (or between conditional equality and the egalitarian-equivalent
solution). This choice can now be based on normative considerations. First, if there
is additive separability between the legitimate and illegitimate causes of diﬀerences in
health care consumption or in health, direct and indirect standardization will lead to the
same results.26 Second, and more importantly, in the general case the choice between
direct and indirect standardization will depend on the relative importance given to the
"no inﬂuence of legitimate diﬀerences condition" 1 and the "compensation condition" 2.
Researchers who (like us) give a greater weight to the compensation condition should
prefer the fairness gap and, hence, the (extended) method of indirect standardization.
Let us repeat that we consider the explicit distinction between empirical and norma-
tive questions one of the main advantages of our approach. Statistical and econometric
considerations should play the crucial role in the choice of the explanatory model. Once
this model has been estimated, however, the further choice of inequality concepts should
be based on normative considerations. In this respect, our approach diﬀers from previous
papers such as Wagstaﬀ and van Doorslaer (2000b), Gravelle (2003), van Doorslaer et al.
(2004) and Van Ourti (2004), which all focus on statistical issues.
26Remember that the estimation of separate equations per income group, as is common in the direct
standardization approach, implies that there is no additive separability.
336 Socioeconomic inequalities and welfare inequality
Until now, we worked in a setting where unfair inequality can reﬂect a whole range of
illegitimate causes of diﬀerences, and not only socioeconomic background. Let us now
consider in more detail the latter. We ﬁrst show how socioeconomic inequality is a special
case of the approach in the previous sections and we discuss the use of concentration
curves instead of Lorenz curves. We then suggest one possible way to integrate health
inequalities in a broader view on welfare inequalities.
6.1 Socioeconomic inequalities, Lorenz curves and concentra-
tion curves
Suppose one wants to focus exclusively on socioeconomic inequalities. In one extreme
interpretation, this would mean that one takes all the other causes of diﬀerences (needs,
information, preferences and supply side restrictions) as legitimate sources of inequality.
Socioeconomic inequalities are then simply a special case of our general framework, and
one could easily compute direct unfairness and the fairness gap. Note that this implies
a speciﬁc ethical position, some aspects of which are highly debatable: that inequalities
due to supply side restrictions are not illegitimate, that one prefers equality of access over
equality of use (because individuals are responsible for their preferences), that health
inequalities following from diﬀerences in lifestyle are unproblematic, that diﬀerences in
health endowments are unavoidable and therefore not unfair.
There is a less extreme and more pragmatic interpretation possible, however. In
that interpretation it is accepted that socioeconomic inequalities are only part of total
unfair inequality. Calculating socioeconomic inequalities is then the calculation of only
that part - without necessarily implying that the other parts are irrelevant (Wagstaﬀ and
van Doorslaer, 2004). This is a reasonable position, but one should not forget the points
raised in the previous section. If one does not work within a fully speciﬁed structural
model, the results will reﬂect a mixture of diﬀerent considerations, including the statistical
correlations between diﬀerent variables that may depend on the sample used. Moreover,
34depending on the method, the disturbance terms will sometimes be interpreted as part of
socioeconomic inequality, sometimes not. To really understand what one has measured,
it is necessary to reason within the full framework that has been sketched in this paper.
There is another important diﬀerence between the traditional approach to socioeco-
nomic inequalities and our proposal. We propose to use (absolute) Lorenz curves, while
most health economic studies work with the concentration curve. Adapted to our nota-
tion, this latter approach means that one cumulates the values of e hi (f mi)o r(hi − h∗
i)
((mi − m∗
i)) not from small to large, but according to Si. Of course, if the rankings in
terms of e mi (or the other variables) and in terms of Si are the same, then the Lorenz
curve and the concentration curve coincide.27 The move to the concentration curve does
only make a diﬀerence if the rankings are not the same. Should we then use it? Some
recent papers on health inequality have argued convincingly that we should not. Fleur-
baey (2006b) shows that interpreting a higher generalized concentration curve to yield
a higher level of social welfare means that it is always good to reduce health in higher
social classes in order to increase it in lower classes. Bleichrodt and van Doorslaer (2006)
have characterized the concentration index with (among other axioms) what they call the
"principle of income-related health transfers", conveying the same idea: it requires that
transferring health from someone who is better oﬀ in terms of socioeconomic status to
someone who is worse-oﬀ does not lead to a reduction in social welfare, provided the trans-
fer does not change the ranking of the individuals in terms of socioeconomic status (pp.
954-955). This principle is hard to accept. In fact, they note that it is "more acceptable
the stronger the correlation between health and other attributes such as income" (p. 955).
This is a paradoxical conclusion, because it basically states that looking at concentration
curves instead of Lorenz curves is more acceptable if the concentration curve looks more
like the Lorenz curve. Then why not work always with the Lorenz curve?28
27Bommier and Stecklov (2002) also mention that the Lorenz curve and the concentration curve in
their approach coincide, if the ranking in terms of E(hi|Si) and the ranking in terms of socio-economic
background are identical.
28An alternative proposed by Erreygers (2006) is the income concentration curve in which individuals
are ranked by health status. As argued by Erreygers, this curve has similar properties as the standard
35The basic reason for the popularity of the concentration curve and the corresponding
indices seems to be the intuition of "cumulative deprivation": a social situation is more
worrying if the economically weak are in addition less healthy, or are in addition treated
in an inequitable way by the health care system. We fully accept the ethical relevance
of this idea of cumulative deprivation. However, the use of concentration curves is not
an adequate way to do justice to it. What is really necessary is to broaden the analysis
beyond the health care sector and, in addition to health, also consider other dimensions
of welfare. We sketch one possible procedure to do so in the next subsection.
6.2 The healthy-equivalent consumption
As soon as one wants to combine diﬀerent dimensions of welfare in an overall evaluation,
one needs a kind of aggregation procedure. The traditional economic approach to this
aggregation problem is to start from the utility function (13). In such an approach, one
would apply the basic ideas of direct unfairness and the fairness gap to the individual
utility levels. However, this implies that one accepts subjective welfare (or utility) as
the ultimate criterion to evaluate social states. It is well known that this raises diﬃcult
issues of interpersonal comparability. Moreover, the ethical criticism on welfarism is now
widely spread, also in health economics. On this basis, many health economists have
drawn the conclusion that one should discard all preference information and leave the
aggregation problem to be solved by the decision-maker. This extreme approach is partly
based on the belief that rejecting welfarism implies that one can no longer use individual
preferences. This belief is mistaken, however. Moreover, in a democratic society it seems
hard to defend an approach which does not at all satisfy the Pareto principle in terms of
(informed) individual preferences. Is it then possible to deﬁne utility functions which do
not measure subjective utility although they represent preferences? One possible way to
proceed has been proposed in Fleurbaey (2005, 2006b). We will simply describe it here
health concentration curve but is preferable when health is measured only ordinally. Nonetheless, it has a
similar (symmetric) puzzling feature as the original concentration curve, i.e., it is always good to transfer
income from a healthy person to a sick person.
36without going into any details, but with some reﬁnements since our structural model is
richer than the basic framework adopted by Fleurbaey (2005, 2006b).29
Recall that individual utility is deﬁned here as Ui(mi,c i,o i,h i). In order to construct
our criterion, we ﬁrst compute the indirect utility function which depends on expenditure
xi instead of the consumption bundle ci :
Vi(mi,x i,o i,h i)=m a x{Ui(mi,c i,o i,h i) | pci = xi}.
Consider ﬁrst a subpopulation of individuals who are perfectly healthy, i.e., hi = hP
for all i.30 One may assume that in this case their utility no longer depends on mi, since
they do not need to be treated. Equivalently, we can simply posit that mi = mP for
all i, for some suitable value of mP. We can therefore simplify the problem and focus
on their preferences over (xi,o i). There is a literature on the deﬁnition of social criteria
for the comparison of consumption-labor allocations on the basis of fairness criteria (for
a survey, see Fleurbaey 2006a). This literature implicitly assumes that the population
under consideration is healthy, which nicely coincides with our problem here. It proposes a
variety of criteria, which correspond to various fairness principles involving diﬀerent views
about responsibility for labor choices. For the sake of illustration, we will retain one of
them here. It consists in computing the equivalent income that would give individuals
t h es a m eu t i l i t yw i t hn ol a b o rd u t y( i . e . ,a c t i v i t i e sa r ef r e eb u td on o tp a ya n ye a r n i n g s ) .
Let this situation of no labor duty be denoted oP. T h ee q u i v a l e n ti n c o m ex∗
i is computed









i.e., individual i is indiﬀerent between the bundles (mP,x ∗
i,o P,h P) and (mP,x i,o i,h P).
Now let us introduce diﬀerences in health and assume that we want to satisfy the
Pareto principle, i.e. we want to respect individual preferences over all the dimensions
29Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2007) discuss how the concept can be introduced in health economic
evaluation studies.
30In deﬁning the indirect utility function, we only introduced a budget constraint. This is a simpliﬁca-
tion of the structural model in section 3 where we also had information and supply restrictions. However,
for the computation of the healthy-equivalent consumption levels, we focus only on perfectly healthy
people. This makes the information and supply restrictions much less relevant.







P)=Ui(mi,c i,o i,h i). (16)
We propose to call x∗
i the “healthy-equivalent consumption” of i.31 The
Pareto principle then implies that society should be indiﬀerent between the
actual situation [(m1,c 1,o 1,h 1),...,(mn,c n,o n,h n)] and the hypothetical situation
£
(mP,x ∗
1,o P,h P),...,(mP,x ∗
n,o P,h P)
¤
. It is then natural to state that our normative eval-
uation of inequalities in well-being should be the same for both situations. Given that
(mP,o P,h P) is the same for all individuals in the latter situation, this means that we
can apply our apparatus of inequality measurement to the vector of healthy-equivalent
consumption levels (x∗
i).
To interpret this approach, note that the healthy-equivalent consumption x∗
i,w h e ni t
is well deﬁned, actually yields a utility function that represents the individual preference
















i denote the corresponding healthy-equivalent consumption levels. Using












which, by monotonicity of preferences, is equivalent to x∗
i ≥ x0∗
i . We can therefore denote
this particular utility function simply as x∗
i(mi,c i,o i,h i).
Although this approach satisﬁes the Pareto principle, it is not welfarist. The wel-
farist approach also satisﬁes the Pareto principle, and does so by deﬁning social welfare
as a function of individual subjective utility Ui(mi,c i,o i,h i). The equivalent consump-
tion x∗
i(mi,c i,o i,h i) is not a welfarist notion because it is not a measure of subjective
utility. Indeed, the two functions Ui(.) and x∗
i(.), although ordinally equivalent and both
representing <i,a r ed i ﬀerent. One way of illustrating the diﬀerence is to look at what
31Rigorously speaking, xi measures expenditures, but the word “consumption” is more pleasant and
captures the essential meaning of the concept.
38happens when two individuals i and j h a v et h es a m ep r e f e r e n c e s<i = <j but diﬀerent
utility functions Ui 6= Uj. Within a welfarist approach, the diﬀerence in utilities will lead
to (possibly unfair) inequality. For the healthy-equivalent consumption approach, in con-
trast, this diﬀerence in subjective utility does not lead to unfair inequality, because i and
j h a v et h es a m eh e a l t h y - e q u i v a l e n tc o n s u m p t i o nf u n c t i o n sx∗
i(.)=x∗
j(.) just as they have
t h es a m ep r e f e r e n c e s<i = <j.32
Measures of unfair inequality will in this approach depend on the choice of perfect
health hP and no labor duty oP as the reference values. We took oP as an example
borrowed from the literature in order to ﬁx ideas. However, we do think that perfect health
is a natural choice of a reference for h. It seems beyond discussion that one considers
an individual to be better oﬀ than another whenever he has a better consumption-labor
bundle, provided both are healthy. This makes sense, whereas the same kind of judgment
would appear questionable if both individuals were not healthy. Imagine that they have
the same mediocre health and, say, slightly unequal consumption-labor bundles. In this
case it is not obvious that the individual with a better consumption-labor bundle is
better oﬀ. Maybe he cares more about health, and therefore suﬀers more from his health
condition than the other one. This problem cannot occur with healthy individuals. We do
not claim that some healthy do not enjoy their good health more than others. We simply
say that it would be a strange conception of fairness to advocate lowering the consumption
of the healthy individuals who care about health in order to increase the consumption of
other equally healthy individuals who care less about health. If one accepts the idea that
some kind of equality with respect to consumption-labor bundles would be a sound ideal
for a uniformly healthy population, then the reference to hP should appear acceptable.
Looking at eq. (16) shows that computing unfair inequality in healthy-equivalent con-
sumption is indeed equivalent to calculating unfair inequality in the bundles (mi,x i,o i,h i)
while respecting individual preferences. Using eq. (5), these bundles can in fact also be
32Such a neglect of utility functions (as opposed to preferences) can be viewed as an application of
the principle of no inﬂuence of legitimate diﬀerences. If we hold individuals responsible for how they
transform ordinal satisfaction into numerical utility, it makes sense to ignore it in the evaluation of their
situations.
39expressed as
(mi,y i − B(mi,r i) − T(yi,c i) − ρ(ri,e i),o i,h i).
This immediately suggests that calculating inequality in healthy-equivalent consumption
oﬀers also a coherent approach for thinking about equity in health care ﬁnance (Wagstaﬀ
et al., 1992, 1999).
7C o n c l u s i o n
Equality of access to health care is one of the proclaimed objectives of social policy in
many countries. There is also growing recognition that inequality in health (e.g. in life
expectancy) is one of the most shocking instances of injustice in our societies. In both
domains, the focus of the social debate is often on socio-economic inequalities. This focus
has been taken over by the huge amount of academic research that has been produced on
these topics in recent years.
While we think that the concern about socio-economic inequalities in health care
delivery and in health is certainly justiﬁe d ,w eh a v ea r g u e dt h a ti ts h o u l db ei n t e g r a t e di n
a broader perspective on distributive justice. The perspective should be broadened in at
least two respects. First, unfairness in health and health care do not only follow from socio-
economic factors. A balanced view on the strengths and weaknesses of social arrangements
should integrate these other factors. Second, there is a hierarchy of principles. Equality of
access to health care matters because it is important for health. And inequality in health
is worrying because health is one of the main components of personal well-being. This is
not to say that it is not interesting (or even necessary) to consider these subdomains of
social policy. However, at the end, the evaluation at a lower level of the hierarchy should
be consistent with the evaluation at the higher level. As an example of this idea, we
proposed to evaluate equity in delivery in terms of a "minimal eﬃcient budget". Along
the same lines, we argued strongly against the use of the concentration curve. The use
of the latter implies some unattractive ethical assumptions, more speciﬁc a l l yt h a ti ti s
always good to reduce health in higher social classes in order to increase it in lower
40classes. The main intuition for the concern about socio-economic inequalities is one of
"cumulative deprivation": we argue that this concern can be captured in a more attractive
way by evaluating socio-economic inequalities in health in terms of inequalities in overall
personal well-being. We have shown that a coherent measure of individual well-being can
be constructed which respects individual preferences but is non-welfarist.
Our approach emphasizes the importance of drawing a clear distinction between the
empirical (or positive) question of explaining behavior (and health) on the one hand
and the normative question of evaluating unfair inequalities on the other hand. To get
a better understanding of the diﬀerent explanatory factors, it is necessary to build a
coherent structural model. Once this information is available, two important normative
decisions have to be taken.
First, one has to decide for each of the causal variables in the model whether they
lead to ethically legitimate or ethically illegitimate diﬀerences in health or health care.
Diﬀerent ethical views will lead to diﬀerent choices. Those advocating equality of access
as an ideal will hold people responsible for their preferences, and will therefore consider
preference diﬀerences as a legitimate source of inequalities. Proponents of equality of
use will take the opposite position. Or, to give another example: while it seems to have
been rather generally accepted that inequalities in health due to biological diﬀerences are
not unfair, we have argued that this is not at all obvious. The framework we propose
is suﬃciently ﬂexible to accomodate these diﬀerent views and to compare the empirical
results.
Second, in general there will exist no inequality measure which satisﬁes two interest-
ing conditions. The ﬁrst ("no inﬂuence of legitimate diﬀerences") states that a measure of
unfair inequality should not reﬂect variations in outcomes which are caused by diﬀerences
in the responsibility variables. The second ("compensation") states that, if a measure
of unfair inequality is zero, there should be no illegitimate diﬀerences left. We proposed
two measures, inspired respectively by the conditional-egalitarian and the egalitarian-
equivalent solutions from the theory of fair allocation. The ﬁrst ("direct unfairness")
satisﬁes the ﬁrst condition, but not the second. The alternative measure ("fairness gap")
41satisﬁes the compensation condition, but will in general take up some diﬀerences due to
responsibility variables. We have argued that the fairness gap is probably the better of the
two measures, but this again reﬂects a normative choice. A closer look shows that direct
unfairness and the fairness gap correspond to direct and indirect standardization respec-
tively. In this way we have also shown what are the normative (rather than statistical)
implications of both standardization procedures.
This paper has explored some links between health economics on the one hand, and
the social choice theory of fair allocation on the other hand. Given the relative popular-
ity of non-welfarist approaches in health economics, it is surprising that the connection
between these two streams of literature has until now been rather tenuous. In our view,
the theory of fair allocation oﬀers a coherent framework to analyse important normative
issues in the domain of health and health care. Further exploration of these links may be
a fruitful path for further research.
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